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An analysis of current international events



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MacArthur Removal Crystallizes Asia Policy Debate

WASHINGTON—The removal on April 11 of General Douglas MacArthur from his posts as commander of United Nations forces in Korea and Supreme Commander in Japan for the Allied Powers gives the United States a chance to discuss openly and to decide its attitude toward Asia.

At present our policy in the Far East is a hodgepodge. The Administration has held steadfast to its position that we are not responsible for the Communists' ascent to power in China and that it is not up to us to force the removal of the Peiping government by military or other means. Yet the vigor of the few Senators and other Americans who advocate a policy of active opposition to the Chinese Communists has induced the Administration to withhold diplomatic recognition from the Peiping regime and to protect the Chinese Nationalists' control over Formosa. This mixing of the two attitudes satisfies few members of Congress, confuses the public and weakens the ability of the Administration to carry on its own policy.

One reason why the Administration has tried to temporize with its critics is that it never had a gauge of the strength of the public support for the advocates of energetic intervention in Asia. The MacArthur incident at last provides that gauge, for the debate which has begun about the General's dismissal is in essence a debate about our role in the Far East. This debate can result in the termination of the Administration's futile efforts to soothe its critics; or it can result in the intervention which General MacArthur has recommended.

While the removal of General MacArthur provoked thousands of Americans to protest to their congressmen and im-

pelled some congressmen to cry for the impeachment of President Truman, the latter had reasons for thinking, despite this outburst, that Americans would support his views and not the General's and therefore simplify his task in the conduct of foreign policy.

One reason for his confidence is the fact that no more than a third of the Senate has in the past supported proposals advocated by Far Eastern interventionists when those proposals threatened to weaken the Administration in the conduct of other programs of foreign policy. A few days before the dismissal of General MacArthur the Senate approved in principle the assignment of American troops to Europe. That decision suggests a general lack of sympathy in Congress with the views which General MacArthur set forth in his letter of March 20 to Representative Joseph W. Martin, Republican of Massachusetts, to the effect that Asia, not Europe, holds the key to American security.

Korean Dilemma

Supporters of General MacArthur nevertheless find strength for their cause in the dilemma of the Administration respecting the Korean war. The inability to date of the United Nations to end the war by fighting on Korean soil alone has made many Americans impatient. Some consequently recommend either the abandonment of the war as a campaign destined to be inconclusive, or to broaden it by bombing raids against Manchuria and by aiding the Chinese Nationalists in Formosa to attempt invasion of the Chinese mainland, as advocated by General MacArthur.

Government officials tend to compare

the Korean war with the recent civil war in Greece, which ended victoriously for the anti-Communists because, according to an analysis offered here, the Communists in time found their repeated forays more expensive in lives and material than they could afford. The President's appointment of Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet to command the Eighth Army in Korea (succeeding Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, whom the President appointed to both of General MacArthur's former commands) underlined the supposed analogy between Greece and Korea. General Van Fleet was American military representative in Greece when the civil war ended in that country. But the fact that the Chinese may withdraw from Korea to their own homeland gives them a strength which Greek guerrillas lacked when they were withdrawing for rest and new supplies to Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.

General MacArthur has another source of strength which might degenerate into a weakness. He has become, for the moment at least, the rallying point not only for those Americans who favor an assault on China but also for some of those who for other reasons consider Mr. Truman an unsatisfactory President. Some strange combinations come out of this association when isolationists like Colonel Robert McCormick of the Chicago *Tribune* are brought together with active interventionists. Congressmen who protested a month or so ago that President Truman was going beyond his constitutional powers in sending troops to Europe disregard the stand taken by the President, to the effect that the Constitution requires the military to subordinate themselves to their civilian

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leaders. Senator Robert A. Taft, Republican of Ohio, who in January opposed the sending of troops to Europe with the argument that this preparedness step might lead to war, on April 12 promulgated the opposite opinion, remarking that "the firing of General MacArthur . . . is a blow to every man and every country in the Far East that favored an aggressive attitude against the spread of communism."

General MacArthur is backed by friends of the policy of aiding Europe as well as by those who consider Europe a waste of time and Asia the only danger spot. Senator H. Alexander Smith, Republican of New Jersey, an unequivocal supporter of the Marshall plan and the North Atlantic treaty, on April 13 termed the dismissal a "colossal blunder." "It might have been possible to change the immediate command in Korea," he said, "but still to retain General MacArthur in the vitally important position he held as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in the

Far East, and especially in Japan." Hope of party advantage might keep these strange associations alive, but jealousy for party leadership might destroy them. General MacArthur has little Democratic support.

The General and the Military

The debate on policy provoked by the dismissal can proceed intelligently only if the facts that led to the dismissal are understood. The President removed General MacArthur from his commands because the President's principal military advisers considered the statements made by the General injurious to the military policy of the United States. This consideration had far greater weight than the dismay which the letter to Representative Martin caused Britain and our other allies. Contrary to the views of some commentators, London is not responsible for MacArthur's removal.

Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall and the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not share General MacArthur's confidence in the fighting ability of the Chinese Nationalist army on Formosa and in Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's competence to command it. If that doubt has any validity, General MacArthur in recommending the use of the Formosa army is suggesting in reality the dispatch of a large American force to China to watch over that army, at a time when Secretary Marshall finds it difficult to persuade Congress to provide the armed forces needed for existing commitments in Europe. By exposing Europe we might be inviting an attack on that continent, just as Senator Taft complained on April 12 we invited an attack on South Korea by removing our troops from that area in 1949. The assumption runs through the MacArthur statements that attack on China would mean quick success, whereas such an attack could lead to a long war.

BLAIR BOLLES

How Strong Are Nationalists on Formosa?

The demand for utilization of Chiang Kai-shek's troops on Formosa in the conflict between the United Nations and Communist China appears to be based on the idea that the Generalissimo has a force in being capable of making an amphibious landing on the mainland.

The Chinese Nationalists themselves, however, pin their hopes, not on a mainland landing, but on the spread of armed rebellion against the Communists among the mainland Chinese. K. C. Wu, governor of Formosa and one of Chiang's most trusted lieutenants, told this correspondent last November: "The only way of saving China is through organization of guerrilla forces. You have got to have us [the Formosa Nationalists] as a beacon of hope for the dissidents on the mainland."

Formosa Defense

Little has been done to organize such forces. Until the outbreak of the Korean war and "neutralization" of Formosa by the Seventh Fleet, Chiang and the Nationalists were busy preparing defenses for the island. They gave little thought to the mainland. Talk of invading it came with the appearance of our fleet.

The number of guerrillas operating in China is anybody's guess. Mao Tze-tung, Communist leader, has admitted there are 400,000. Chiang claims there are 1,600,000. There is little evidence that these guerrillas owe allegiance to Chiang.

Chiang also claims an army of 500,000 on Formosa and a marine force of 11,000, as he once claimed an army of 7 million during the war against Japan and an army of 4 million in the recently lost war against the Communists. However, the figures are of doubtful significance, even if true, for Chiang's soldiers are not the equivalent of ours.

General Sun Li-jen, commander-in-chief of the ground forces, rates their capabilities as much lower than those of the men he commanded as head of the New First Army of World War II, which was trained in India by General Joseph W. Stilwell and supplied by the United States. Most of the Nationalist troops on Formosa wear ragged uniforms, and thousands are barefoot. Many carry wooden mock rifles, while others are armed with a nondescript array of American, Japanese and Chinese weapons. General Sun pointed out that the army, in its retreat from the mainland to Formosa, lost three-quarters of all its weapons, including virtually all its artillery.

Chiang has 1,000 tanks, but these are a doubtful asset, since all are World War II models with 37-millimeter guns or obsolete Shermans with 75s. A fuel shortage keeps most of them immobilized. Scores were dug in along the coast, where they are rusting away. Although a few 60-millimeter mortars are manufactured on Formosa, there is a severe shortage of such weapons,

of heavier mortars and of tank-killing bazookas. The shortage of ammunition is even more pronounced.

Training has been of the sketchiest type. An American Marine general who spent months on the island told this correspondent last November: "They've spent their time digging fixed defenses along the coasts and now much of their time is absorbed in growing gardens. There have been no field maneuvers to speak of."

Leaders on Formosa

The Marine general described Sun, graduate of the Virginia Military Institute, as an "able commander, but virtually without authority," since he lacked any political following and apparently wanted none. He was named Formosan defense commander in 1949 and commander-in-chief of the army in 1950, but both are "empty titles," real command remaining with the Generalissimo, who exercises it through General Chou Chih-jou, Chinese chief of staff and concurrently commander-in-chief of the air force. Under Chou are commanders of four military districts, into which Formosa is divided. Sun has little authority over these men, although from time to time small groups of their officers and men are sent to his training installations for refresher courses.

Even at his schools, Sun's authority is circumscribed. In every unit of command there is a "political commissar" of rank parallel to that of the military commander.

These are under the leadership of Chiang Ching-kuo, son of the Generalissimo, who was educated in the Soviet Union. The American Marine general said Chiang Ching-kuo exercised a rigid "thought control." The words "thought control" were actually used in the original directive under which the system operates but were later changed to "reporting on activities."

Chiang Ching-kuo is the originator of an "overcoming difficulties movement" under which General Sun's men were told to grow vegetables to eke out their scanty rations.

Of all Sun's problems, supply is the worst. He is dependent for both supply and transport equipment on a board of supply which is not answerable to him but to the Executive Yuan, or cabinet, headed by General Chen Cheng, Nationalist premier and long-time associate of the Generalissimo. Sun, according to the American Marine general, has to devote most of his time to wheedling supplies out of this board. When he wants to move a regiment, he must go to it to get trucks. This complicated system, likened by one observer to a "can of angle worms," shocked a survey mission sent to Formosa last

August by General Douglas MacArthur. The Marine general described it as "impossible."

Control of the board over the air force and the navy is less onerous, for both brought most of their equipment with them when they fled from the mainland, while the army lost almost all its weapons and supplies. The air force, however, has only obsolete planes, no match for modern jets.

It is the opinion of the Marine general that the only hope for effective use of the manpower in the Nationalist ground forces would be to "shunt Generalissimo Chiang and the supply board aside" and put logistics "directly under American command." He said: "There is no possibility of a mainland invasion unless we give 100 per cent assistance logistically as well as air cover and naval transport."

Formosa's Civil Rule

Chiang, while retaining in the family a tight grip on the army, has given K. C. Wu considerable leeway in the civil government of Formosa. Wu has carried out vigorously a land reform program which forced landlords to scale down once-

usurious rents to 37.5 per cent of the crop. He has stabilized the Formosan currency and, for the first time in Chinese history, has held free elections which gave Formosans a voice in Nationalist affairs.

Wu has also set out to do something about civil liberties. Theoretically no one can now be arrested without a police warrant or without the provincial governor being notified. Recently severe sentences have been handed down against persons convicted of having given false witness against those accused of subversive activity. This development reflects a lessening of the fear of internal rebellion, which in the early months of last year resulted in many persons being taken out and shot by secret police organizations, several of which still operate in Formosa.

Wu's achievements give some hope of improved administration should the Nationalists ever return to power on the mainland. But Wu is the first to admit that it takes fewer good men to administer affairs on an island than on a continent.

PHILIP POTTER

(Philip Potter, member of the Washington Bureau of the Baltimore *Sun*, recently returned from a visit to Formosa.)

Wiley Proposes 6-Point Program for U. S. Leadership

The history of mankind shows that in certain periods a particular nation, for one reason or another, dominates the globe, either in a military, economic, political and/or spiritual sense. Today the United States, because of a wide variety of circumstances—the fact that it has been physically untouched by two world wars, the fact of its dynamic free enterprise system and its great political system of checks and balances in government, and so on—has emerged as the leader of the forces of Western civilization.

The United States, moreover, is still legally at war. Peace treaties with Germany and Japan have not been signed. Our obligations of World War II remain, and our armed forces—on land, in the air and on the seas—are poised for action in Europe and elsewhere.

'Divide and Conquer'

So, whether we like it or not, we have no alternative but to fulfill the obligations of leadership and our treaty obligations under the United Nations Charter and the Atlantic pact. Not only is it impossible for us to crawl into a shell, but such an absurd policy would be completely undesirable from the point of view of our own self-interest. We dare not allow a

vacuum to be created which the forces of Russian Communist aggression would fill. We dare not play into Joseph Stalin's strategy of "divide and conquer"—allowing ourselves to be separated from our allies by fears and doubts. This would per-

As its contribution to the "great debate" the Foreign Policy Association has invited distinguished leaders of differing opinions to present their views on the course the United States should follow in world affairs. The twelfth article in the series appears in the adjoining columns.

mit the Kremlin to gobble up its enemies one by one. This is no time to retreat. Rather, with courage and faith, we must advance.

May I suggest, therefore, the following six points in a program of American leadership:

1. The United States should be prepared to send such further military contingents—air, sea, land—to Europe, as will accord with the judgment of our military experts. General Dwight D. Eisenhower has rightly stressed the tremendous value

of such American contingents to bolster European morale. Obviously, however, our land forces should be sent only in numbers proportionate to Western Europe's own contributions. But what the precise ratio should be, if any, is up to our executive and military leaders to determine. Congress might well be consulted but should not attempt to shackle our military leadership with armchair generalship from Capitol Hill.

2. The Congress and the Executive of the United States should cooperate as partners in foreign policy, each fulfilling its responsibilities—Congress, for example, in control of appropriations, the President in the actual spearheading of policy. Neither branch should exceed its respective jurisdiction. Congress should not become a rubber stamp for the President, but neither should it arrogate unto itself the initiation of foreign policy. The Supreme Court has confirmed the office of the Presidency as the basic organ of American foreign relations.

Military Aid Crucial Problem

3. American aid programs abroad must be based primarily on the improvement of the military potential of the Western alliance. Much as we dislike to see aid

siphoned almost exclusively into military and semimilitary channels, it is a fact that the only crucial question in the world today is whether or not a country is prepared to defend itself and its allies in the basic battle for survival. We have learned on the frozen battlefields of Korea that the basic fact about Turkey, for instance, is that its manpower has the superb determination and valor to fight magnificently on our side. If we could become similarly enthusiastic about our other allies, much of our problem would be on its way to solution.

4. There must be the closest continuing cooperation between military leaders and those charged with the making of foreign policy. I have tried to point out in recent months that the anticipated nature of future warfare with new weapons and techniques has an important bearing on our diplomatic program. That is why I believe there should be more joint conferences between the Senate and House Armed Services committees, and the Senate and the House foreign policy groups.

5. The United States has never fully utilized the existing military potential for fighting communism behind the Iron Curtain. I renew my suggestion therefore for the creation of a Board of Counter-Revolutionary Strategy to operate along the lines laid down by the Office of Strategic Services during World War II. The board, functioning at the highest policy level, could stir up dissension in Stalin's own camp. We may find that millions of enslaved peoples ask only that we give them the arms and ammunition to raise hob behind the Iron Curtain. By giving Stalin and his satellites something to think about at home, we may discourage by exactly that much their tendencies toward foreign aggression.

End Loose Talk

6. Every American leader, military, economic, political and diplomatic, should learn to guard his tongue most carefully. We should recognize that every single word we say or write here is communicated throughout the world. Our every word creates either fear or encouragement among our allies and our enemies.

My comment does not mean that there must be a lessening of the "great debate" or a swallowing of individual convictions

in order to create a phony impression of "unity"; rather it means that we should all stand for genuine cooperation. There can be a healthy difference of opinion. But there must not be loud-mouthed or irresponsible talk which creates unnecessary friction at home and abroad.

These, then, as I see them, are a few of the fundamental points in America's program for Western leadership.

ALEXANDER WILEY

(This article was specially prepared for the FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN by Senator Wiley of Wisconsin, ranking active Republican member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.)

Branch and Affiliate Meetings

SPRINGFIELD, April 21, *England and the Council of Europe*, Kenneth Lindsay

NEW YORK, April 23, *Power Politics in Iran*, N. Saifpour Fatemi

PHILADELPHIA, April 23, *What Is Our Foreign Policy and How Should It Work?* John W. Nason

ST. LOUIS, April 23, *Taking the Offensive in Our Global Crisis*, Gen. William J. Donovan

DETROIT, April 24, Annual Meeting

PHILADELPHIA, April 24, *What Are the U.S. Stakes in Europe?* H. Field Haviland, Jr., Johannes U. Hoerber; *If You Were Secretary of State*, Rex Crawford, John McCullough

ST. PAUL, April 24, *How Can the Development of Backward Areas Safeguard Peace?* Stringfellow Barr, Lennox A. Mills

BOSTON, April 25, *The Next Phase in U.S. Foreign Policy*, Vera M. Dean

DETROIT, April 25, *Where Is Our Foreign Policy Leading Us In Latin America?* Norman Guice

PHILADELPHIA, April 25, *U.S. Foreign Policy in Asia*, Norman Palmer, Lewis Hoskins

NEW YORK, April 26, *Who Makes Our Foreign Policy?* Blair Bolles

PHILADELPHIA, April 26, *Turkey and the United States*, Ambassador Feridun C. Erkin; *The Campaign for Truth vs. Communism*, Elinor K. Wolf, Melvin K. Whiteleather

MILWAUKEE, April 27, 28, Institute on U.S. Foreign Policy in cooperation with the Department of State, Gen. A. Robert Ginsburgh, Hon. Wayne Morse

PHILADELPHIA, May 1, *Is McCarthyism Affecting Our Foreign Policy?* Frederick Chait

PITTSBURGH, May 1, *Strategy of Freedom*, Nelson A. Rockefeller, Ambassador V. L. Pandit; *The Strategy of Freedom in Asia*, Robert A. Smith, Hon. Dean Rusk, Hon. Frank S. Tomlinson

PROVIDENCE, May 1, Annual Meeting, Milton Mayer

DETROIT, May 2, *Where Is Our Foreign Policy Leading Us at Home?* Alfred H. Kelly

PITTSBURGH, May 2, *The Strategy of Freedom in Europe*, Henry C. Wolfe, Edwin Martin, Richard Bissell; *The Strategy of Defense*, Gen. A. Robert Ginsburgh, John A. McCone; *A Global Strategy for the Free World*, Hon. W. Averell Harriman

ALBANY, May 3, *International Tensions and the Minds of Men*, Dr. Otto Klineberg

News in the Making

BRITAIN'S BUDGET: To meet the expenses of rearmament, Chancellor of the Exchequer Hugh Gaitskell in his budget presented to Parliament on April 10 boosted Britain's income tax rates and levies on distributed profits and the sale of luxuries. The increase in the already high income tax raises about half the needed revenue, while the other measures are expected to close the rest of the gap. The chancellor ruled against cutting the social services or allowing a deficit to develop in the series of balanced budgets Britain has had since 1946.

CANADA'S POLICY: In an outspoken speech at Toronto on April 10, Canada's Secretary of External Affairs Lester B. Pearson declared that the days of "relatively easy and automatic relations" with the United States are over. Canada, he declared, seeks to prevent the United Nations from becoming "too much the instrument of any one country" and reserves the right to criticize "our great friend, the United States."

INDONESIAN CRISIS: The high price of rubber has helped to stave off economic disaster for the new Republican regime in Indonesia, but a complex of knotty problems nevertheless precipitated a cabinet crisis when Dr. Mohammed Natsir—after six months in office—resigned as prime minister on March 20. His successor has yet to be determined. Dr. Sartono, a leading member of the opposition Nationalist party, is seeking to form a new cabinet. The powerful Masjumi (Muslim) party, leading component of the Natsir cabinet, still refuses to join Sartono, however, and the impasse remains to be resolved.

UNREST IN IRAN: The closing on April 15—for the first time since 1918—of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's refinery at Abadan, the world's largest such plant, indicates the far-reaching problems that may arise as a result of continued agitation in Iran for nationalization of the British-owned oil fields. This agitation, fanned both by religious fanatics and by Communists, could prevent the Western powers from drawing on the oil reserves of Iran even if it should prove impossible for the U.S.S.R. to make use of these resources.

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